

Executive Registry

76-3153

9 AUG 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Advisory Group Members  
SUBJECT : Papers on CIA Goals

Attached are three papers for discussion at the Tuesday, 10 August, session. The first paper was done by Mr. Knoche. The second and third papers were prepared by our Office. All are intended to stimulate discussion on the general question of goals for CIA.

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✓ James H. Taylor  
Secretary  
Executive Advisory Group

Attachments:  
As stated

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1. We need to know our identity. How does CIA adjust and define its roles and missions in light of new arrangements to make distinctive and separate the two DCI functions of Community coordinator and Agency head? Do we expand or add to our common concern functions? Do we reassign to others some of our work (SIGINT, reconnaissance, large-scale R&D)? Should the COS role be revised? And how do the General and Legislative Counsels serve DCI-ICS and DCI-CIA?
2. We need a planning and evaluation capacity to:
  - proceed from our estimate of future international prospects and problems.
  - set goals and objectives.
  - fix strategies and timetables for reaching those goals and objectives.
  - evaluate performance.
3. We need to ensure our resources (personnel and funds) are properly balanced among Agency functions. (The essential Agency functions are collection, processing, analysis and production, assisted by support elements, R&D and covert action.) What review layers can be reduced or removed in DDI? How much overhead support is required in DDO (and how much can be reduced)? Can we correlate DDO with DDA reductions and drop DDA size accordingly? In all Directorates, are there any programs we can terminate? What new programs would we like to create?
4. There needs to be a capacity to do interdisciplinary analysis and production, starting with the USSR and China. What kind of organization, resources and processes are required to accomplish this?
5. There needs to be development of processes and equipment to permit multi-media presentation of intelligence products.
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7. We must plan new space and reallocate existing space to employ space as an incentive to better work.
8. We need to agree on ways to tighten internal oversight without discouraging innovation.
9. We need to know whether we gain or lose by centralizing R&D, ADP and personnel policy. In the case of all three, we must ensure relevancy to operational needs.
10. We need to revise terms of the FOI and Privacy Acts. Quantify the workload, define the wrongs. Devise a better internal system to calculate pros and cons in responding to external requests for information.

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#### AGENCY GOALS

In thinking about goals for CIA, I have had the following general criteria in mind. Goals should be Agency-wide, or they should at least cross directorate lines. They should be limited in number--ten is probably a maximum if we are going to make any serious progress on them in addition to all the other tasks we have set for ourselves. They should be things which we can relatively easily figure out how to make some progress on. They should touch on items which are of real importance to you or other EAG members. And they should reflect our need at this time to do something bold in selected areas where we are reasonably certain we are right.

The following are some specific thoughts. Each, if agreed to, will require careful restatement by those of you who understand them better than I do.

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c. We should develop for implementation a production apparatus which provides: (1) at least a minimal "current events" coverage of every country in the world; (2) a functional "reservoir of expertise" on such subjects as world economic developments, agricultural trends, strategic and defensive weapons systems and conventional forces developments; and (3) which will improve our ability to carry out interdisciplinary analyses of developments in the Soviet Union, Communist China, and other priority countries or regions. This production apparatus should: provide for improved integration of the work of photointerpreters into the production process, increase our ability to gather consumer reaction to the intelligence product, and increase our ability to think about longer term developments. By 31 December 1976.

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d. We should develop a new DDO organizational structure and concept of mission which are based upon agreement as to how many field case officers would be allocated to selected intelligence problems and activities and which provide the minimum Headquarters and station management support to those case officers. By 31 January 1977 (in order to be able to argue against expected House Committee proposals by presenting an alternative, better developed, structure for the future). Consideration might be given to including the communications function within this operations organization.

e. We need command and control arrangements which insure the existence of a process which will identify problems of legality or propriety requiring management attention. We should review present policy with the IG and the General Counsel, and in the regulations, to insure the adequacy of current arrangements. In particular, we need to communicate to employees what is or is not permissible in the new environment. This requires that we develop a guidance package which is updated annually and which lays out the black and white, and also the grey, legal areas and requires rapid OGC review of projects or activities (new and on-going) meeting certain specified criteria. Development of such a package and of an expeditious review process may require more legal resources and perhaps a new organizational approach. (It is critical that the field not have to wait three weeks for an answer to a question.)

25X1 f. We should push hard to improve Community responsiveness to CIA substantive requirements by: (a) emphasizing (in the context of SIGINT study) NSA responsiveness to CIA analytical needs in return for enhanced NSA participation in selected Agency SIGINT assets; and improving the DDCI's ability to offer substantive judgments on resource alternatives in the CFI. (This will require development of a coordinated approach by DDS&T and, through the Requirements and Evaluation Staff of the Comptroller's Office, the production components.)

g. We should consider a dramatic step in the direction of improved personnel management. The decades old debate here involves the question of centralization versus decentralization. The question really is how much centralization since a totally centralized system in all aspects would probably be totally unworkable.

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We suggest a decision now to centralize the Office of Personnel under DDCI direct control and reconsideration of the proper locus for all present personnel functions across the Agency (recruitment, executive development, promotion and career development, assignments and perhaps Equal Employment Opportunity) with a bias toward centralized control except where it is obvious to all that decentralization makes more sense. Such reconsideration might include a review of the present career service structure to see whether we could implement a functional rather than an organizational career service structure. (We might, for example, have career services for analysts, development engineers and scientists, managers of all kinds, operational people, and support offices. Such a functional approach would tend in certain areas to increase rotation between directorates.)

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James H. Taylor

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AGENCY GOALS

I. PERFORMING OUR MISSIONS

Goal: Excellence in the collection, processing and analysis of intelligence information and the production of all-source finished intelligence for national-level consumers. Effective, covert action programs.

A. This depends on:

1. Quality of personnel;
2. Efficiency of management structure;
4. Making maximum use of other USG intelligence programs;
5. Obtaining feedback from customers and reflecting that in the product;
6. Selectivity--concentrating our resources on important subjects to which intelligence can make a unique contribution;
7. Ensuring that intelligence information is readily and rapidly available to all those in CIA who need it;
8. Eliminating dependence on vulnerable overseas territory;
9. Understanding the opposition; and
10. Effective RD&E.

B. What to do about it:

There are an unlimited number of possible tasks to be done to approach this goal. Some of the most fundamental involve personnel. We need to take a hard look at our current hiring and retention policies. The essential message in this area should be speed and selectivity. We must reduce processing time to no more than two months, to ensure that we can compete for the best brains available. We must develop and enforce a program to identify hiring errors and ease those individuals out in no more than three years. And once we have hired the best people we can find, we must make the most of them--with overseas tours for analysts, well-conceived long range training plans hand tailored to individuals, and an Agency-wide rotation plan.

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As to the efficiency of the management structure, certain organizational changes are suggested under Goal V. Beyond that, we need strong central direction of personnel policy, better planning (see Goal IV), combination in one place of some split functions (e.g., contracting), less centralization of decisions on such non-problems as vacation trips to England, elimination of all paper work on which there is no clear follow-up, prioritized submissions of all budget requests for external contracting funds for both RD&E and analysis, and the inventory of the current disposition of our personnel that is already in train. In addition, we need to reduce the numbers of types of publications, concentrating on producing Agency intelligence, not component-identified intelligence. And we should consolidate publications-support activities such as graphics and editing.

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Previous attempts to enhance selectivity by letting Agency managers tell us what they would delete to hold their programs down have proven rather fruitless. We should consider polling all our employees, asking them what they think the Agency can and should cease doing. We would, of course, get a great many impractical answers, but we would probably get some good ones too.

Selectivity must be applied to covert action programs, with particular attention to rigorous definition of possible gains and a hard look at the prospects for exposure of our role.

On making information available to those who need it, we should begin by sizing the problem. The Requirements and Evaluation Staff should be tasked to identify the trouble spots--both in dissemination of Agency information and in acquisition and dissemination of information gathered by other Community elements.

We need to do an all-encompassing overseas territory dependence study. Where are we now dependent on access to foreign territory for essential information? In each case, what are the alternatives, if any? Assuming that resource constraints will force us to phase any changes, which programs ought to get priority attention? This is another area in which the Requirements and Evaluation Staff probably should be the focal point.

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We need to know far more than we do about Soviet intelligence capabilities--both for counterintelligence purposes and to equip us to answer questions from our Congressional oversight bodies. A Community study on this was commissioned last year but subsequently cancelled at the behest of the DDI. If a Community effort has been ruled out for some valid reason, an Agency effort (DDI and DDO) should be mounted.

We need to keep our RD&E efforts firmly focused on our missions. Our obvious needs for the future include:

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- c. Long range and inexhaustible power sources;
- d. Collection systems less vulnerable to attack; and
- e. Analytical techniques that reduce uncertainty.

## II. INTERNAL CONTROL

Goal: Internal oversight mechanisms that prevent abuses.

### A. This depends on:

- 1. Clearly defining "abuses" and communicating those definitions to all employees;
- 2. Making reporting of possible abuses easy and suppression of such reports impossible;

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4. Taking strong disciplinary action in any case of deliberate abuse and making knowledge of that action widely available within the Agency.

### B. What to do about it:

This function is vested in the Inspector General, who should be responsible for initiating suggestions for improvements.

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III. OUR PLACE IN THE USG

Goal: The most productive relationships with other parts of the USG.

A. This depends on:

1. Developing agreed ground rules for handling grey areas in Executive Branch/Congressional relations;
2. Examining the current relationship with Congress and determining where guidelines developed by us or Executive Branch as a whole are depriving Congress of information it needs to do its business;
3. Working with and through the IC Staff to perfect Community relationships;
4. Creating fast and effective links to all Executive Branch agencies; and
5. Creating a clearly understood and optimally effective role for the Chief of Station.

B. What to do about it:

We should develop a CIA position on what we see as Congress' legitimate substantive intelligence needs in the next few years, identify the possible problem areas, and be prepared to raise the matter with the White House shortly after the first of the year.

We should encourage development of effective Congressional oversight mechanisms that will combine optimum security with serious Congressional attention to the Agency.

We should initiate a program to educate all our senior personnel in the field on the subject of our oversight Committees, their members, their interests and the Agency's position on subjects of interest to those Committees.

[ ] of OCI is the logical team leader for such a project.

We must actively encourage CIA people to involve the IC Staff in our relationships with the rest of the Community.

We need to identify all the various links to other Executive Branch agencies we now have, find out where they are weak or non-existent, and propose remedial action.

We need to take a hard look at the relationships between our Stations and the other parts of overseas missions.

[ ] How can we protect sources and methods while ensuring that each Ambassador has all the information we can give him that he needs to do his job most effectively?

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#### IV. PLANNING

Goal: Concise and workable plans for the future.

A. This depends on:

1. Defining our roles and missions;
2. Committing resources and talent to the identification of future problems and the development of systems (collection, processing, and analytical) to help solve the problems);
3. Protecting those resources from the press of near term business; and
4. Convincing managers that they will have to live with their plans.

B. What to do about it:

Establish an interdirectorship team, composed of working analysts and operators, tasked to propose to EAG a list of subjects for intensive study and a timetable that will produce a viable planning document before the next Program Review.

#### V. ORGANIZATION

Goal: An organization that permits us to (1) function effectively as a single agency, both in carrying out our daily responsibilities and in dealing with other government entities, (2) produce multi-disciplinary analysis, and (3) divine and react rapidly to the desires of our customers.

A. This depends on:

Creating an entirely new organization structure in which the end result desired is the decisive criterion. That structure should be mission-oriented--collection, production, and support. Its pieces should relate naturally to one another and to other foreign affairs agencies and departments--as many as possible should be geographically defined. Rotational assignments should be obligatory.

B. What to do about it:

Each Deputy Director should be tasked to produce an outline of an organizational structure for the entire Agency within a month.

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## VI. EEO

Goal: Make major improvements in our EEO performance.

### A. This depends on:

1. Communicating the interest of the DCI and DDCI in EEO frequently and forcefully to all components;
2. Reducing processing time for personnel candidates, so we have increased opportunity for hiring the best available; and
3. Encouraging promotion of minorities.

### B. What to do about it:

1. Hold quarterly sessions in which Deputies report to the DCI and DDCI on EEO progress; distribute a report on each such session to all employees.
2. Assign specific numerical goals for hiring and promotion to all components that do not develop their own.
3. Instruct the Office of Personnel to develop, and enforce on hiring and processing components, special procedures for expediting processing of minority applicants.
4. Insist that all career promotion panels include minority representation.
5. Hold component managers personally responsible for providing training, experience, guidance, and assignments that permit minority employees to be fully competitive in the promotion process.

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DISCUSSION PAPER FOR MEETING TO REVIEW EAG PERFORMANCE  
Thursday, 9 September 1976

The following thoughts are intended to be helpful to you in our conversation Thursday to review EAG performance thus far. They are only my personal views; so far as I am concerned the more provocative and the more critical the discussion tomorrow, the better all of us will be served.

The EAG was conceived to be an advisory body which would make recommendations to the DDCI but not itself make decisions. It was designed to take on difficult problems, not easy ones. Further, the original concept was that we would for the most part focus on problems which cut across the line of command or across the Directorates, and not on those issues which are properly the province of one of the Deputy Directors. Finally, an implicit assumption was that the EAG would meet often enough, and tackle problems of sufficient interest, that members would come to see themselves as part of a problem-solving team which could cope with some of the most difficult issues we face in an open and nonparochial manner.

I offer the following assessment of "how well we have done" as a point of departure. On the positive side, I think the agenda has been good in the sense that we have generally dealt with the right kinds of issues, given our basic concept. Also, we have individually and collectively devoted a good deal of time to carefully defining our problems before focusing on solutions. Further, I think that we have developed a collegial spirit in which some problems which have gone undiscussed between Deputy Directors for many years have been surfaced, and in some cases, potentially high-payoff or high-visibility work is under way. Finally, we have brought ourselves as a group to a generally common level of understanding on several important topics.

On the negative side, while I sense that in general we feel reasonably good about progress to date, our efforts have little visibility, and, more important, very few real decisions affecting CIA have been made. Related to this, relatively few

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Without attempting to limit the discussion tomorrow in any way, I suggest that we include discussion of the following questions:

- 4) Are there further suggestions as to agenda, staff support, the format of meetings, or any of the other details of our existence which should be considered?

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Secretary  
Executive Advisory Group

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